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In May 2014, the global ridesharing service, Uber, began operations in Auckland, 
New Zealand and by March 2019, Uber was available in seven cities across the 
country. As in other countries, Uber New Zealand‘s press releases claim that the 
presence of Uber reduces the incidence of drunk driving. Using monthly data on 
drunk driving crashes and alcohol-related driving offences in the various regions 
of New Zealand, we find that the presence of Uber in a city is often associated with 
small decreases in these indicators of drunk driving, but these results consistently 
lack statistical significance. 
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I. Introduction 
Drunk driving has long been a major issue in New Zealand society. In 2010/11, 17% of all 
traffic fatalities and 18% of all serious traffic injuries in New Zealand were considered “alcohol-
induced” (White, et al., 2014).1 Moreover, 31% of New Zealand traffic fatalities in 2013 involved 
some level of alcohol intoxication, the third-highest rate among twenty-four “high-income” 
countries (World Health Organisation, 2015). The annual social cost of alcohol-related crashes 
between 2011 and 2014 was estimated to be $495 million (Ministry of Transport, 2015).  This 
estimate consisted of factors such as medical bills, legal fees, vehicle and property damage, and 
loss of life; all of which are directly incurred by drunk driving. 
There have been several attempts to treat this problem in New Zealand. Some treatment 
strategies focus on raising awareness of the consequences of drunk driving through educational 
programmes, or advertising campaigns such as “Dilemmas” and “Legends” (NZ Transport 
Agency, 2019).  Another strategy is random police checkpoints that give roadside breath tests, 
which serve to increase the likelihood of being caught. National policy has also been used to curb 
drunk driving; in May 2011, Parliament passed the “zero tolerance” law, which states that drivers 
under 20 years of age cannot drive if their blood alcohol concentration (BAC) is non-zero. This 
was followed in August 2014 by a lowering of the BAC limit for over-20 drivers from 80mg/100ml 
to 50mg/100ml, bringing New Zealand more in line with international best practice. 
While the above interventions were aimed at solving the drunk driving problem, this paper 
focuses on a less intentional treatment strategy: the introduction of ridesharing. A ridesharing 
service is one that matches customers seeking transportation with private drivers in their area, 
usually through a smartphone application that supports credit-card transactions. Taking a rideshare 
is generally cheaper and more convenient for customers than taking a taxi. Ridesharing thus could 
act as a drunk driving treatment if a certain proportion of drivers drive drunk because their primary 
alternative, taking a taxi, is too costly and/or difficult to arrange, especially when intoxicated. 
                                                 
1 “Alcohol-induced” traffic accidents were responsible for 43 out of 259 fatalities, and 614 out of 3,366 serious 
injuries. 
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Uber first entered New Zealand in May 2014, and expanded operations to a total of seven 
cities within five years of its entry2. Uber’s entry into a city could thus act as a region-specific 
drunk driving “treatment”, the effects of which can be separated from nationwide treatments such 
as advertising campaigns and law changes. Since Uber’s entry into the country has been staggered 
across the last five years, we can use monthly data to isolate the treatment effect and observe any 
Uber-driven changes to the drunk driving rate of each city.  
When launching their service in Christchurch, Uber themselves implied this result by 
claiming to be “having a positive impact on issues…such as drink-driving” (Bruce, 2016). The 
strongest verification of this so far is a 2016 study carried out on Uber’s behalf, which found that 
70% of Uber users in New Zealand had used the service after drinking; 41% of users who drink 
said that Uber had helped them avoid drunk driving; and 75% believed that Uber helped to reduce 
drunk driving in their community (NZ Herald, 2016). This paper provides a more comprehensive 
investigation of this claim. 
Similar studies have been conducted overseas, specifically in the United States of America. 
These studies have tended to use a difference-in-differences approach to compare drunk driving 
rates in U.S. cities before and after the entry of Uber. Many have found some level of decrease in 
drunk driving rates that can be attributed to Uber, although the size and significance of the decrease 
varies across studies. In this study for New Zealand, we observe a weak negative effect, but never 
find this effect to be statistically distinguishable from zero. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we provide a short 
overview of the literature that links Uber and drunk driving. In section 3, we discuss the data 
sources and methods used in this paper. Section 4 presents the results of our analysis, while section 
5 concludes. 
II. The presence of Uber and drunk driving 
Why might people who previously elected to drive drunk view Uber as a preferable option? 
One possible explanation is that Uber simply offers more convenience. There is a growing 
literature concerning the sharing economy and platform economics, both of which Uber utilises. 
Parker and Van Alstyne (2005) explain that a “platform intermediary” such as the Uber app 
                                                 
2 Competitors like Zoomy, Ola, and DriveHer have entered the New Zealand market but remain small. 
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reduces transaction costs and maximises consumer surplus. Uber’s app asks the passenger to select 
a destination and a pickup point; assigns a driver almost instantly; provides the passenger with 
information about the driver and their car; and handles payment electronically through previously 
entered payment details. This process bypasses transaction costs that are incurred by taking a taxi, 
such as arranging/locating a driver; articulating the destination; waiting for the taxi to arrive; 
identifying the taxi once it has arrived; and organising payment, sometimes with cash. These 
transaction costs can also be significantly exacerbated by intoxication. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to expect that intoxicated individuals would receive significantly more utility from a taxi service 
if able to bypass these transaction costs. 
The other key reason is the financial cost of taking an Uber. Uber has been able to undercut 
taxi prices in New Zealand, with research from GO Rentals (2017) showing that taking a taxi to 
the airport in New Zealand cities is roughly twice as expensive as taking an Uber.3 It is clear that, 
if a similar price disparity existed when travelling from the city to the suburbs, drunk drivers who 
previously considered taxis to be prohibitively expensive might now be incentivised to take an 
Uber instead. 
It is important to note, though, that it is difficult to establish exactly how large the price 
disparity is in this situation. Firstly, it appears that there are additional regulations involved in 
being an “airport taxi” that may not be enforced for Uber (Chu, 2015), which could result in taxi 
prices being particularly high for airport trips. This may mean the results from the above study are 
exaggerated. Secondly, it is likely that late at night on Friday and Saturday (i.e. popular drinking 
times) will be a period of high demand and low supply for rideshare services; therefore, it is likely 
that Uber’s surge pricing would be employed. Surge pricing results in a multiplier being applied 
to the standard Uber fares in order to equilibrate supply and demand (Hall, Kendrick, & Nosko, 
2015). This could result in Uber prices being substantially higher than normal during peak drinking 
hours, which may reduce the incentive for consumers to switch away from taxis—or, indeed, from 
drunk driving. 
Despite this uncertainty, and despite the inherent difficultly in predicting the behaviour of 
poor decision-makers, it seems plausible that the marginal drunk driver, i.e. one who only slightly 
                                                 
3 Specifically, taxi rides were 1.86 times more expensive in Auckland; 2.11 times more expensive in Christchurch; 
and 1.70 times more expensive in Wellington. 
Series of Unsurprising Results in Economics   
- 5 -  
prefers drunk driving to taking a taxi, may have switched to Uber when it became an option. 
Theory therefore supports the hypothesis that the introduction of Uber could have caused a 
decrease in drunk driving in New Zealand cities. 
As modern ridesharing is a relatively recent phenomenon, the academic literature 
surrounding its impact is still emerging. However, we have identified thirteen studies that consider 
the impact of ridesharing on drunk driving, ten of which use data from the United States of 
America. This study thus extends the small literature that looks at the impact of ridesharing beyond 
North America. 
Table 1: An Overview of the Literature on Ridesharing and Drunk Driving 






fatal alcohol-related auto 
accidents - -10% to -11.4% yes U.S. 
Brazil & Kirk (2016) traffic fatalities + 1% no U.S. 
Greenwood & Wattal (2017) 
alcohol-related motor 
vehicle fatalities - -3.6% to -5.6% yes U.S. 
Peck (2017) 
alcohol-related collision 
rate - -25% to -30% yes U.S. 
Dills & Mulholland (2018) fatal accidents - -0.20% yes U.S. 
Downie (2018) drunk driving - -5.4% to -7.3% yes U.S. 
Morrison, Jacoby, Dong, 
Delgado, & Wiebe (2018) crashes - depends on the city unclear U.S. 
Barrios, Hochberg, & Yi 
(2020) 
fatalities and fatal 
accidents + 3% yes U.S. 
Zhou (2020) drunk driving - -4% no U.S. 
Brazil & Kirk (2020) traffic fatalities + 1% no U.S. 
Huang, Majid, & Daku (2020) 
weekly road traffic-
related deaths - 
< 2 deaths per 
province per year yes 
South 
Africa 
Kirk, Cavalli, & Brazil (2020) number of fatal accidents + 3% no 
Great 
Britain 
Lagos, Munoz, & Zulehner 
(2020) 
drunk-driving fatal 
accidents and fatalities - about -50% yes Chile 
Table 1 not only shows that most studies use U.S. data, it also suggests there is a very large 
variation in results. For example, using U.S. data, Peck (2017) finds a sizeable and significant 
negative effect on the alcohol-related collision rate, while Brazil and Kirk (2020) find no 
significant effect and Barrios, Hochberg and Yi (2020) find a positive effect on fatal accidents. A 
similar variation can be seen across countries. Finally, Morrison et al. (2018) show that results 
even can vary across cities. This geographical variation suggests it is important to analyse the 
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impact of ridesharing in a wide range of settings, hence the importance of a study focusing on New 
Zealand. 
III. Data and Methods 
The New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) granted us access to their Crash Analysis 
System (CAS), which records detailed information about every vehicle crash that occurs in New 
Zealand (NZ Transport Agency, 2018). Using this data, we examine the monthly drunk driving 
crashes in each territorial authority of New Zealand. We also have data on the monthly number of 
alcohol-specific driving offences by police area, as provided by the New Zealand Police (2019). 
These datasets provide a good approximation of the frequency of drunk driving in each location. 
Using regional data allows us to separate the locations with Uber from those without, and using 
monthly data allows us to identify Uber’s exact point of entry in each location.  
We use data from January 2012 until March 2019.4 Starting in January 2012 helps to avoid 
any confounding effects from the 2011 law changes, while still providing enough data about pre-
Uber drunk driving trends in each city. The confounding factor of the December 2014 decrease in 
the adult legal BAC limit cannot be avoided, and it is important to note that, while this was a 
nationwide law change, it may have affected different locations in different ways.  
Unfortunately, the geographical units used in the crash data are different from those used 
in the offence data. This forces us to keep the two datasets separate, as there is no easy way to 
compare the two types of geographical unit. For the sake of clarity, we will describe each type of 
geographical unit and use consistent terminology throughout this article: 
 The crash data allow us to separate alcohol-related crashes by territorial 
authority. There are 67 territorial authorities in New Zealand; these consist of 13 
city councils, 53 district councils, and the Chatham Islands Council. The population 
of territorial authorities varies a lot, from less than a thousand to over a million 
people, with the median population being about thirty thousand. Territorial 
authorities can be grouped into 16 regions, except for the Chatham Islands Council 
which does not belong to a region.  
                                                 
4 The crash data was taken from the CAS website on August 24th, 2019. The offence data was published on the NZ 
Police website in May 2019. 
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 The offence data allow us to separate alcohol-related crashes by police area. There 
are 38 police areas in New Zealand, and they can be grouped into 12 police 
districts. 
Table 2 lists the seven New Zealand cities which Uber has entered, along with the month 
of entry and corresponding geographical units. These units are what we are referring to when we 
report data for the number of crashes/offences in a given city. Although in some cases it may be 
possible to call an Uber outside of these geographical units, we have selected those that would see 
the vast majority of Uber traffic for each city.  





Region Police area(s) Police district(s) 
Auckland May 
2014 





Lower Hutt City, Porirua 
City, Upper Hutt City, 
Wellington City 











Hamilton City Waikato Hamilton City Waikato 
Tauranga Jan 
2018 




Bay of Plenty 
Dunedin May 
2018 
Dunedin City Otago Otago Coastal Southern 
Queenstown Jun 
2018 
Queenstown-Lakes District Otago Otago Lakes 
Central 
Southern 
There are a wide range of econometric tools available with which to conduct this analysis. 
Following the precedent set by similar studies, we primarily use a difference-in-differences 
framework, always accounting for both time and location fixed effects. The main dependent 
variable is the number of monthly drunk driving crashes/offences by location. Uber’s influence on 
this will be measured using an independent dummy variable, which will be set to 1 when Uber is 
present in a given month and location, and 0 otherwise. We include other explanatory variables, 
                                                 
5Auckland City: Auckland Central, Auckland East, Auckland West;  
Counties/Manukau: CM Central, CM East, CM South, CM West;  
Waitematā: Auckland Motorways, Waitematā East, Waitematā North, Waitematā West 
6 Note that we are considering the Wellington metropolitan area, or “Greater Wellington”. 
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including local population and time-specific dummy variables accounting for other policy changes. 
Additionally, we experiment with more specific dependent variables, as alcohol-related crashes 
can be stratified by severity and timing.  
It is important to note that, when retrieving data from the Crash Analysis System, there are 
multiple ways to filter the data for crashes involving alcohol. Given we are primarily interested in 
crashes involving an intoxicated driver who is over the legal BAC limit, we define “drunk driving” 
crashes as those where the following contributory factor code (Hewitt, 2016) is associated with 
the crash: 103 — alcohol test above limit or test refused. 
We are therefore omitting the following alcohol-related codes, as they do not confirm that 
alcohol was a contributory or causal factor in a crash: 
 101 — alcohol suspected; 
 102 — alcohol test below limit; 
 105 — impaired non-driver (pedestrian/cyclist/passenger, etc.); 
 100 — other alcohol. 
Although some previous studies have chosen to include drug-related crashes and offences 
as part of their analysis, we have chosen to omit this and focus only on alcohol. This is because 
the data contains relatively low numbers of drug-related crashes and offences, suggesting fairly 
infrequent testing. For example, the first crash reported as drug-related in the dataset occurred in 
May 2016, at which point three Uber entries had already taken place. Therefore, it seems unlikely 
that including these in the analysis would help to draw meaningful conclusions. 
To control for different locations having different population growth rates, we include local 
population data in the analysis where possible. However, it is important to note that population 
data is only available for territorial authorities, and not for police areas. Therefore, local population 
data can only be included in the regressions involving the crash data. Moreover, the available 
population data is annual rather than monthly, and therefore only gives the population of each 
territorial authority in June of each year. To obtain local population data for all months, we have 
used a linear logarithmic interpolation procedure. We believe this is a suitable solution, as the costs 
of the extra assumptions required for interpolation are outweighed by the benefits of being able to 
include local population in the regressions without drastically reducing the number of 
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observations. To capture any changes in the number of cars on the road that are not related to 
population, we also include the number of other (i.e. non-drunk driving) crashes. 
Another important control variable we consider is the presence of local alcohol policies 
(LAPs) (Tyler-Harwood & Kutinova Menclova, 2021), (Alcohol Healthwatch, 2018). These are 
localised extensions of the Sale and Supply of Alcohol Act 2012, which allows territorial 
authorities to develop their own set of rules regarding the location, density and opening hours of 
licensed alcohol-providing premises. LAPs have been adopted in 34 out of 67 territorial authorities 
on a staggered basis from August 2014 to September 2018. We include a dummy variable to denote 
the presence of LAPs in a territorial authority, as their introduction could potentially affect drunk 
driving rates and would not be captured in time or location fixed effects. Similarly to population, 
it is difficult to determine whether an LAP is present in a police area due to the different 
boundaries, so we omit this variable from the analysis of the offence data. 
IV. Regression Analysis 
A. Crash data 
First, we analyse the data describing the number of drunk driving crashes in each 
territorial authority. For an overview of this data, see Table 3 and Figures A1 and A2 in the 
appendix. Table 3 contains the yearly number of drunk driving crashes in each region of New 
Zealand from 2012 to 2018, while Figures A1 and A2 graphically depict the monthly crash trend 
in each of the New Zealand cities where Uber has entered over the period of interest. 
In our regression analysis, we use the following model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = α + β𝑈𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + γXit + δ𝑖 +ω𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable in question, usually the number of drunk driving crashes in 
location 𝑖 in month 𝑡. 𝑈𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the dummy variable that is set to 1 if Uber is present in location 𝑖 
in month 𝑡, and 0 otherwise. Xit is a vector including the other control variables: local population, 
other crashes, and LAPs. δ𝑖 and ω𝑡 represent location and time fixed effects respectively, which 
are always included due to the panel structure of the data. 
The first set of regressions (Table 4) simply considers the effect of Uber on all drunk 
driving crashes. We include regressions with and without the extra control variables. Because the 
dependent variable contains discrete count data, a Poisson regression is the more appropriate 
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estimation method. However, for context we also include the results of an OLS regression for each 
model. For both types of regression, we include robust standard errors clustered at the location 
level. 
Table 3: Yearly Number of Drunk Driving Crashes in New Zealand by Region 
Region 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Auckland 
881 795 730 826 930 1,287 1,354 
Bay of Plenty 
147 123 100 139 187 181 245 
Canterbury 
285 248 279 243 305 340 374 
Chatham 
Islands7 
0 1 2 0 0 0 0 
Gisborne 32 34 26 26 36 50 59 
Hawke’s Bay 
93 66 56 72 99 125 136 
Manawatu-
Wanganui 
125 110 103 108 142 160 212 
Marlborough 
23 17 12 16 21 31 35 
Nelson 
20 28 15 19 23 33 33 
Northland 
115 120 115 114 147 169 210 
Otago 
112 107 102 87 159 153 196 
Southland 
62 44 48 66 60 60 58 
Taranaki 
60 41 44 48 69 72 96 
Tasman 
19 26 13 13 23 31 28 
Waikato 
236 221 175 196 246 309 376 
Wellington 210 164 152 196 186 262 287 
West Coast 
25 14 18 24 17 30 32 
Total 
2,445 2,159 1,990 2,193 2,650 3,293 3,731 
Note that blue text denotes the presence of Uber in the corresponding region and year. Dunedin and Queenstown 
are both located in the Otago region. 
Note that, for both the Uber and LAP dummy variables, we report the coefficient followed 
by the standard error and p-value respectively. All three are rounded to three decimal places. For 
the OLS regressions, the coefficients can be interpreted as the numerical change in the dependent 
variable in response to the presence of Uber/LAPs. For the Poisson regressions, the coefficients 
can be interpreted as the change in the mean of the natural log of the dependent variable in response 
to the presence of Uber/LAPs. Therefore, for these regressions, exp(𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡) − 1 represents 
the percentage change in the dependent variable in response to the presence of Uber/LAPs. For 
                                                 
7 Chatham Islands is a territorial authority that is not part of any region. 
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clarity, the coefficient is followed by an asterisk if it is significant at the 10% level (p < 0.10), and 
two asterisks if it is significant at the 5% level (p < 0.05). 
Table 4: The Impact of the Presence of Uber on Overall Drunk Driving Crashes 




























Local population — — ✓ ✓ 
Other crashes — — ✓ ✓ 
Location fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Time fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Estimator OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
N 5,829 5,829 5,829 5,829 
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.9069 0.7199 0.9464 0.7203 
Beneath each coefficient is the standard error and p-value, respectively.  
Note that this is not a confidence interval.* denotes significance at the 10% level, and ** denotes significance 
at the 5% level. 
Interestingly, regression (1) suggests that Uber is associated with an average monthly 
increase in drunk driving crashes of 3.549. While this is statistically significant at the 10% level, 
this regression does not include the control variables, so it is likely an under-specified model.  
Once extra variables are included, the Uber coefficient in regression (3) actually flips its 
sign and suggests that Uber decreases drunk driving crashes by 1.149 crashes each month. The 
Poisson regressions, (2) and (4), suggest that Uber reduces drunk driving crashes by 1.22% and 
2.35%, respectively. However, none of these coefficients are statistically significant, so one cannot 
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infer with any reasonable level of confidence that the true value of the coefficient is non-zero. We 
would therefore interpret from regressions (2)-(4) that Uber may cause a small decrease in drunk 
driving crashes, but that there is not enough evidence to conclusively confirm this. 
To further examine the effect of Uber, drunk driving crashes can be separated by severity 
(Table 5). We define “severe” drunk driving crashes as those that involved fatalities or serious 
injuries; and “non-severe” drunk driving crashes as those that only involved minor injuries, or no 
injuries at all. If Uber is to be considered an effective drunk driving treatment, it would need to 
reduce severe crashes as well as non-severe crashes, given that severe crashes incur most of the 
social costs of drunk driving. The next set of regressions examines the effect of Uber on both types 
of crashes, using both OLS and Poisson estimations with the full set of independent variables. 
Table 5: The Impact of the Presence of Uber on Severe vs. Non-Severe Drunk Driving Crashes 






























Local population ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Other crashes ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Location fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Time fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Estimator OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
N 5,829 5,829 5,829 5,829 
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.6226 0.3297 0.9407 0.7195 
Beneath each coefficient is the standard error and p-value, respectively. Note that this is not a confidence 
interval.* denotes significance at the 10% level, and ** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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The Poisson regression (6) suggests Uber is associated with a 3.42% increase in severe 
drunk driving crashes, and regression (8) suggests Uber is associated with a 3.33% decrease in 
non-severe drunk driving crashes. The OLS regressions also carry the same sign (positive and 
negative, respectively). This implies that Uber is perhaps more likely to reduce non-severe crashes 
than severe crashes, and it is surprising to see a positive coefficient in the regressions for severe 
crashes. However, these coefficients are all statistically insignificant at both a 5% and 10% level, 
with especially high p-values in regressions (5) and (6), and the coefficient estimates are therefore 
not sufficiently different from zero to reliably infer a causal effect of Uber entry. 
Table 6: The Impact of the Presence of Uber on Weekend vs. Weekday Drunk Driving Crashes 




























Local population ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Other crashes ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Location fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Time fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Estimator OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
N 5,829 5,829 5,829 5,829 
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.9315 0.6559 0.8971 0.6017 
Beneath each coefficient is the standard error and p-value, respectively. Note that this is not a confidence 
interval.* denotes significance at the 10% level, and ** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
Given that we also have data about the exact time of each crash, we can separate drunk 
driving crashes into those that occurred on a weekend and those that did not (Table 6). We follow 
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the lead of the CAS and define the “weekend” as the time between 6:00pm on Friday and 6:00am 
on Monday. Although this time period only constitutes 35.7% of the week, 57.9% of drunk driving 
crashes in the dataset occurred during these hours. It has been established that Uber’s surge pricing 
is more likely to be in effect during the weekend due to a spike in demand from intoxicated 
passengers. Greenwood & Wattal (2017) found that, while Uber did impact drunk driving in 
California overall, there was no effect when restricting the data to weekends only. Therefore, it is 
worth examining the New Zealand data to see if a similar distinction exists. 
All four regressions suggest that Uber is associated with a small reduction in drunk driving 
crashes on both weekends and weekdays. Regression (10) suggests a 1.52% decrease on weekends, 
while regression (12) suggests a 3.45% decrease on weekdays. Moreover, the coefficient in 
regression (10) carries a p-value of 0.774, so the effect on weekends is very likely to have a true 
value of zero. This is consistent with the hypothesis, and previous findings, that Uber has a bigger 
effect on drunk driving on weekdays when surge pricing is less likely to be in effect. However, 
once again it is important to note that all Uber coefficients in regressions (9) – (12) are small and 
statistically insignificant at a 10% level, so strong conclusions cannot be made about Uber’s effect 
on weekends versus weekdays. 
The effect of Uber on drunk driving in individual cities can also be examined by restricting 
the dataset to a city and its immediately surrounding territorial authorities, which might be 
expected to share strong similarities with the city and therefore act as a suitable control group.  We 
look at the three most populated cities—Auckland,8 Wellington,9 and Christchurch10—as these 
would be expected to have the largest Uber user base and have had access to Uber for longest. The 
results of these regressions can be found in Table 7. 
The Poisson regressions suggest Uber is associated with decreases in drunk driving crashes 
in Auckland and Christchurch of 14.20% and 3.13% respectively; and an increase in Wellington 
of 28.70%. Although none of these coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level, the 
Uber coefficients in the Auckland and Wellington regressions are relatively large and consistent 
in sign with their OLS counterparts, which are statistically significant at the 5% level. Therefore, 
                                                 
8 Using a control group of Hauraki, Kaipara, Thames-Coromandel, Waikato, and Whangarei. 
9 Using a control group of Carterton, Kapiti Coast, Masterton, and South Wairarapa. 
10 Using a control group of Ashburton, Hurunui, Selwyn, and Waimakariri. 
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there is some evidence pointing to an Uber-driven decrease in drunk driving crashes in Auckland, 
and an Uber-driven increase in drunk driving crashes in Wellington. Given the high p-value in 
regression (18) and the changing sign on the Uber coefficient between regressions (17) and (18), 
Uber does not appear to have had a meaningful impact on drunk driving crashes in Christchurch. 
Table 7: The Impact of the Presence of Uber on Crash Data for Each of the Three Major Cities 
and Their Surrounding Areas 
Regression 
number 

















































✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Other crashes ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Location fixed 
effects 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Time fixed 
effects 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Estimator OLS Poisson OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
N 522 522 696 696 435 435 
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.9701 0.9063 0.7047 0.3803 0.8827 0.6627 
Beneath each coefficient is the standard error and p-value, respectively. Note that this is not a confidence interval.* 
denotes significance at the 10% level, and ** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
B. Offence Data 
Next, we analyse the data describing the number of alcohol-specific driving offences in 
each police area. For an overview of this data, see Table 8 and Figures A3 and A4 in the appendix. 
Table 8 contains the yearly number of alcohol-specific driving offences in each police district of 
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New Zealand from 2012 to 2018, while Figures A3 and A4 graphically depict the monthly offence 
trend in each of the New Zealand cities where Uber has entered over our period of interest. 
In our regression analysis, we use the following model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = α + β𝑈𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + δ𝑖 +ω𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the number of drunk driving offences in location 𝑖 in month 𝑡. Again, 𝑈𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the 
dummy variable that is set to 1 if Uber is present in location 𝑖 in month 𝑡, and 0 otherwise. In this 
model, we do not include the vector of control variables, Xit, due to a lack of data that is organised 
into police areas. The location and time fixed effects, δ𝑖 and ω𝑡, are still always included. 
Table 8: Yearly Number of Alcohol-Specific Driving Offences in New Zealand by Police District 
Region 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Auckland 2,434 2,175 1,662 2,163 2,321 2,251 2,346 
Bay of Plenty 2,896 2,478 2,082 2,659 2,761 2,893 3,039 
Canterbury 3,353 2,734 2,707 3,140 2,878 2,555 2,434 
Central 2,319 1,820 1,607 2,019 2,005 1,857 1,947 
Counties/Manukau 3,038 2,816 2,335 2,994 2,401 2,892 2,955 
Eastern 1,906 1,808 1,539 1,504 1,425 1,665 1,973 
Northland 1,472 1,273 1,175 1,783 1,601 1,268 1,305 
Southern 1,650 1,350 1,230 1,577 1,754 1,694 1,854 
Tasman 976 929 759 881 971 1,172 1,122 
Waikato 2,337 2,127 1,842 2,473 2,776 2,673 2,422 
Waitemata 3,147 3,045 2,370 2,807 2,521 2,629 2,622 
Wellington 2,115 1,985 1,661 2,139 2,065 1,994 1,888 
Total 27,643 24,540 20,969 26,139 25,479 25,543 25,907 
Note that blue text denotes the presence of Uber in the corresponding region and year. Dunedin and Queenstown 
are both located in the Otago region. 
Once again, the first set of regressions with the offence data considers the effect of Uber 
on all alcohol-specific driving offences (Table 9), and we use both OLS and Poisson regressions, 
with robust standard errors clustered at the location level. 
Regression (19) suggests that the presence of Uber is associated with a decrease in alcohol-
specific driving offences by 5.74 crashes per month on average, while regression (20) suggests 
that it is associated with a 9.64% reduction on average. The p-values for these regressions are both 
relatively low, but not low enough to conclude significance at a 90% or 95% confidence level. 
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Although the data does not allow separation of alcohol-specific driving offences by 
severity or date, it is still possible to look at the impact of Uber on offences in individual cities. 
Once again, we restrict the dataset to a city and consider its immediately surrounding police areas 
as a control group. Again, we choose the three most populated cities—Auckland,11 Wellington,12 
and Christchurch13— the results for which can be found in Table 10. 
Table 9: The Impact of the Presence of Uber on Overall Alcohol-Specific Driving Offences 
Regression number (19) (20) 






Location fixed effects ✓ ✓ 
Time fixed effects ✓ ✓ 
Estimator OLS Poisson 
N 3,306 3,306 
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.7708 0.5517 
Beneath each coefficient is the standard error and p-value, respectively. Note that this is not a 
confidence interval.* denotes significance at the 10% level, and ** denotes significance at the 5% 
level. 
Regression (22) suggests Uber has caused a 10.60% decrease in alcohol-specific driving 
offences in Auckland. On the other hand, regressions (23) – (26) yield statistically significant 
coefficients and higher R2/pseudo-R2 values. Regression (24) suggests Uber is associated with a 
4.06% increase in alcohol-specific driving offences in Wellington, while regression (26) suggests 
Uber is associated with a 27.92% decrease in alcohol-specific driving offences in Christchurch. 
Each of these results is also reasonably consistent with the respective OLS regression. It is 
                                                 
11 Using a control group of Far North, Waikato East, Waikato West, and Whangarei. 
12 Using a control group of Manawatu, Wairarapa and Whanganui. 
13 Using a control group of Canterbury Rural and Mid-South Canterbury. 
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especially noteworthy that Uber appears to have had such a large impact on alcohol-specific 
driving offences in Christchurch, especially given that we did not find a similar impact on drunk 
driving crashes. However, it is important to note that the regressions involving Christchurch used 
quite a low number of observations due to the relatively small number of police areas constituting 
Christchurch and its surrounding areas. This could potentially impact the robustness of any 
conclusions. 
Table 10: The Impact of the Presence of Uber on Offence Data for Each of the Three Major 
Cities and Their Surrounding Areas 
Regression 
number 
















































✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Time fixed 
effects 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Estimator OLS Poisson OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
N 1,305 1,305 522 522 261 261 
R2 / Pseudo 
R2 
0.4290 0.2453 0.7442 0.4325 0.9498 0.8675 
Beneath each coefficient is the standard error and p-value, respectively. Note that this is not a confidence interval. 
* denotes significance at the 10% level, and ** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
V. Discussion 
Overall, these findings indicate that Uber is mostly associated with small but statistically 
insignificant decreases in both drunk driving crashes and alcohol-specific driving offences.  While 
a Poisson regression suggests that Uber is associated with a 2.35% decrease in drunk driving 
crashes, a 95% confidence interval indicates the true value of this relationship could be anywhere 
between a 10.20% decrease and a 5.19% increase. A similar confidence interval suggests that 
Uber’s apparent 9.64% decrease in alcohol-specific driving offences could actually be anywhere 
Series of Unsurprising Results in Economics   
- 19 -  
between a 25.83% decrease and a 4.71% increase. In both cases, while it is perhaps more likely 
that there has been a decrease, there is not enough evidence to make any strong conclusion 
regarding causality between Uber and the drunk driving indicators.  
A similar situation exists when comparing Uber’s relationship with severe vs. non-severe 
drunk driving crashes, or weekend vs. weekday drunk driving crashes; ultimately, we cannot 
confirm that any distinction exists between each of the two groups. When looking only at each of 
New Zealand’s three major cities, we find a small amount of evidence suggesting that Uber is 
associated with drunk driving crashes decreasing in Auckland and increasing in Wellington 
relative to their respective surrounding areas. The findings also indicate that Uber is associated 
with alcohol-specific driving offences increasing in Wellington and decreasing in Christchurch 
relative to their respective surrounding areas. 
The lack of a consistent and sizeable effect can be related back to the economic theory 
behind the relationship between Uber and drunk driving. We established that there may have been 
a subset of the population, described as “marginal drunk drivers”, who viewed drunk driving as 
marginally preferable to taking a taxi, but might now view Uber as preferable to drunk driving. 
Although the existence of this group cannot be ruled out, it seems like it is not a large enough 
subset of the New Zealand population to cause a noticeable difference in drunk driving crashes 
and alcohol-specific driving offences. 
There are many reasons why drunk drivers with this specific preference order might only 
constitute a very small proportion of all drunk drivers. Many individuals who drive drunk, and 
especially those who are likely to cause crashes, may be beyond the threshold of rational decision-
making and are not in a suitable frame of mind to weigh up the costs and benefits of alternate 
transportation options. They may also possess an innate belief in their own driving ability while 
drunk, and hence the low likelihood of crashing or getting caught. It is also possible that using 
Uber does not provide substantially more utility than taking a taxi for most users, and therefore 
the number of people who consider drunk driving as a middle ground between those two options 
may be quite low. Additionally, Uber’s advantage of being easier to use when intoxicated may not 
always be relevant, as people often make transport arrangements when they make the initial 
decision, while sober, to leave home with or without their car.  
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Even if the group of marginal drunk drivers is a reasonable proportion of all drunk drivers, 
they may not have made a noticeable impact on drunk driving rates if the overall user base of Uber 
in each city is relatively low. It is possible that Uber has not “caught on” to the same extent in New 
Zealand cities as, for example, in New York City, where Peck (2017) found a substantial effect of 
Uber on the alcohol-related collision rate. 
In summary, we have found no strong indication of a causal relationship between the entry 
of Uber and the incidence of drunk driving in New Zealand. While the coefficients in the 
regressions frequently reflect small Uber-related decreases in the drunk driving indicators, they 
are generally not statistically significant at any reasonable confidence level. Therefore, our 
findings do not support Uber’s claim that they are having a beneficial impact on drunk driving, but 
also do not conclusively disprove this claim. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1: Monthly Number of Drunk Driving Crashes in Cities with Uber, not Including 
Auckland (January 2012 – March 2019) 
 
The vertical dashed lines represent Uber’s month of entry into the city of the corresponding colour.  Note that 
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Figure A2: Monthly Number of Drunk Driving Crashes in Cities with Uber, Including 
Auckland (January 2012 – March 2019) 
The vertical dashed lines represent Uber’s month of entry into the city of the corresponding colour.  Note that 
Uber entered into both Hamilton and Tauranga in January 2018, hence the yellow and grey vertical line. 
 
Figure A3: Monthly Number of Alcohol-Specific Driving Offences in Cities with Uber, 
not Including Auckland (January 2012 – March 2019) 
 
The vertical dashed lines represent Uber’s month of entry into the city of the corresponding colour.  Note that 
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Figure A4: Monthly Number of Alcohol-Specific Driving Offences in Cities with Uber, 
Including Auckland (January 2012 – March 2019) 
 
The vertical dashed lines represent Uber’s month of entry into the city of the corresponding colour.  Note 
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